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ABSTRACT
The Article discusses in four distinct parts disputes
relating to maritime boundaries in the Arctic; "gaps" in the
legal regime in the Arctic; environmental and security
concerns; and the administrationof the Arctic.
Regarding the first item, the Article maintains that the
point of departure is that the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea applies also in the Arctic. Overlapping
claims by the coastal states are perfectly legitimate and thus
should not be dramatized. What matters is how such
differences are resolved.
Referring to suggestions that there are "gaps" in the
Arctic legal regime and that a new regime is needed, the
Article asserts that this argumentation is misleading as
UNCLOS already applies. However, the regime needs
strengthening.
Several conclusions are presented concerning the
environment and security, partly based on experiences from
a conference organized by the Nordic Council of Ministers on
September 9-10, 2008 at Ilulissat in Greenland: "Common
Concern for the Arctic."
With respect to the administration of the Arctic, the
Article maintains that the Arctic Council should be
maintained and further developed as an indispensable tool
for the coordinationof policy decisions.
The Article concludes by suggesting that the Arctic
actually offers an opportunity for states concerned and in
particularthe Arctic coastal states to demonstrate that they

* Hans Corell was Ambassador and head of the Legal Department of the
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs from 1984-1994 and Under-SecretaryGeneral for Legal Affairs and the Legal Counsel of the United Nations from 19942004. Since his retirement from public service in 2004 he has been engaged in
numerous activities in the legal field, inter alia as legal adviser, lecturer, and

member of different boards. He serves as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of
the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law at Lund

University, Sweden. This Article is based on an address delivered at Vanderbilt
University in February 2009.
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are able to cooperate actively in a constructive manner. One
way of ascertaining that added political impetus is injected
into the process would be to organize the 2011 Arctic Council
meeting at the level of heads of state and government.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Distinguished participants,
First of all, I would like to thank the Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law for inviting me to address you on this
occasion. The panel in which I am participating is to address
boundary claims as well as environmental, social, and security
concerns.
I have chosen to entitle my address The Arctic: An
Opportunity to Cooperateand to Demonstrate Statesmanship. The
purpose of choosing this title is not only to rebut the many
ominous statements about upcoming conflicts relating to the
Arctic but also to emphasize that the issues that undoubtedly
emerge in the Arctic, not least because of climate change, actually
offer an opportunity for the states concerned to demonstrate how
such matters should be dealt with by responsible actors on the
international arena. My address consists of four distinct parts: (1)
disputes relating to maritime boundaries; (2) "gaps" in the legal
regime; (3) environmental and security concerns; and (4) the
administration of the Arctic. I will conclude with a few remarks
as to why I believe that the Arctic actually offers an opportunity
to cooperate and demonstrate statesmanship.

II. DISPUTES RELATING TO MARITIME BOUNDARIES

The point of departure in discussing disputes relating to
maritime boundaries in the Arctic is that the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) applies in the
Arctic. This point has been made over and over again in the
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debate, and I do not intend to dwell upon it now. I refer to my
earlier Reflections on the Possibilities and Limitations of a
Binding Legal Regime.'
It should also be noted that on May 28, 2008, the five coastal
states bordering on the Arctic Ocean-Canada, Denmark,
Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States of
America-adopted the Ilulissat Declaration. 2 The following quote
is of particular interest in this context:
Notably, the law of the sea provides for important rights and
obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the
continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment,
including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine
scientific research, and other uses of the sea.
We remain
committed to this legal framework and to the orderly settlement of
3
any possible overlapping claims.

The reason for the conspicuous absence of a clear reference to
UNCLOS is of course that the U.S. has not yet ratified the
Convention. 4 Despite the fact that both the Clinton and Bush
administrations have advocated ratification of this treaty, the
matter still lingers in the U.S. Senate. 5 Some of the arguments
advanced against ratification of the treaty are so ignorant of the
factual situation that they represent an almost surrealistic
6
reading.
The latest news in this matter appears in the directive on
Arctic Region Policy issued by President Bush on January 9, 2009

1.
See Hans Corell, Reflections on the Possibilities and Limitations of a
Binding Legal Regime, 37 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 321, 321-24 (2007), available at
http://www.havc.se/res/SelectedMaterial/20070604corellarcticlegalregenvpolicyl .p
df (arguing that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea applies in
the Arctic).
2.
Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat, Green., May 27-29, 2008, Ilulissat
Declaration (May 28, 2008), in DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2009 154, 154
(Danish Inst. for Int'l Studies ed., 2009).
3.
Id.
4.
See Directive on Arctic Region Policy, 45 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
47, 49 (Jan. 9, 2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/search.html
(select "2009 Presidential Documents" then search "Directive on Arctic Region
Policy"; then follow PDF link) (suggesting that the U.S. Senate act favorably on
the U.S. accession to UNCLOS).
5.
Id.; see Letter of Transmittal from William J. Clinton, President, U.S.,
to U.S. Senate (Oct. 7, 1994), available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/
dispatch/1995fhtmllDispatchv6Supl.html ("I therefore recommend that the Senate
give early and favorable consideration to the Convention and to the Agreement
and give its advice and consent to accession to the Convention and to ratification of
the Agreement.").
6.
See, e.g., Oliver North, Trojan Horse Sea Law, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 2,
2005, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005apr/02/20050402111012-7230r/ (arguing that ratification of UNCLOS would be "an invitation to an
assault on [U.S.] sovereignty and security"); David A. Ridenour, Ratification of the
Law of the Sea Treaty: A Not-So-Innocent Passage, 542 NAT'L POL'Y ANALYSIS 1
(2006), available at http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA542LawoftheSeaTreaty.html
(arguing that UNCLOS, if ratified, would undermine U.S. military interests by
outlawing important naval capabilities and would possibly cause the U.S. to "lose
control of their environmental laws").
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7
(the U.S Arctic Policy directive). According to this directive, "[t]he
Senate should act favorably on U.S. accession to [UNCLOS]
promptly, to protect and advance U.S. interests, including with
'8
respect to the Arctic." Let us hope that this question will now be
moved forward in the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate
under the chairmanship of Senator John F. Kerry. In the
meantime, the U.S. will no doubt apply UNCLOS anyway; most of
9
the Convention is customary international law.
Ocean,
it
is
obvious that there
a
region
like
the
Arctic
In
with respect
to maritime
might be overlapping claims
delimitation. These may relate to the territorial sea, the exclusive
economic zone, or the continental shelf. Such overlapping claims
are perfectly legitimate and should not be dramatized. On the
contrary, claims of this nature can be expected as a natural
consequence of the applicable law. What matters is how such
differences are resolved. The first step is, of course, that the
and analyze relevant
do their homework--collect
parties
Thereafter the parties
geographic and geomorphologic data.
should compare those data and try to resolve any differences
through negotiations. If the parties cannot settle the differences
through negotiations, there is always the option of resorting to
The International Court of
third party dispute settlement.
10
and the International
Justice has dealt with many such cases,
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is now also competent to deal with
such matters." This question is also addressed in the U.S Arctic
Policy directive, which encourages the "peaceful resolution of
12
disputes in the Arctic region.'
In the past, I had the privilege of chairing the Swedish
delegation in three negotiations relating to the maritime
delimitation in the Baltic. I always think of these negotiations as
The work was constructive and highly
a positive experience.
interesting. However, since I have developed my thinking on
these issues in the past, notably the questions relating to the
continental shelf, I do not intend to dwell further upon them now,
13
particularly since other participants will address them.

Directive on Arctic Region Policy, supra note 4.
Id. at 49.
See Peter Buxbaum, U.S. Administration Pushes UNCLOS, ISN
SECURITY WATCH, Aug. 24, 2007, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/
Security-Watch/Detail?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB- 1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng
=en&id=53665 ("US policy since the Reagan administration has held that
UNCLOS reflects customary international law and asserted navigational rights
based on the treaty's provisions.").
10.
See, e.g., Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa
Rica v. Nicar.), 2009 I.C.J. (July 13), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/133/15321.pdf (addressing a dispute between two countries over navigation
rights on the San Juan River).
11.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Annex VI, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 availableat http://www.itlos.org.
12.
Directive on Arctic Region Policy, supra note 4, at 49.
13.
See Hans Corell, The North Is Not the Wild West, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Apr. 28, 2008, at A.15, available at http://www.theglobeandmail.coml
news/opinions/article682229.ece (arguing that delimitation in the Arctic is
7.
8.
9.
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"GAPS" IN THE LEGAL REGIME

I now come to the second part of my presentation: "gaps" in
the legal regime. In January 2009, I had the privilege of cochairing a conference organized by Arctic Frontiers at Tromso in
Norway entitled "The Age of the Arctic."1 4 A specific issue raised
at this Conference, in particular by the World Wide Fund for
Nature (WWF), was the question of "gaps" in the international
governance and regulation of the marine Arctic. A distinction was
made between "governance gaps" and "regulatory gaps." The
former concept refers to gaps in the international institutional
framework, including the absence of institutions or mechanisms
at a global, regional, or sub-regional level, and inconsistent
mandates of existing organizations and mechanisms. The latter
refers to substantive and/or geographical gaps in the international
legal framework-issues which are currently unregulated or
insufficiently regulated at a global, regional, or sub-regional level.
At the Conference, reference was made to an Overview and Gap
15
Analysis that the WWF had commissioned.
Based on this analysis, representatives of WWF challenged
the Ilulissat Declaration and argued that we need a "new legal
regime" for the Arctic. With reference to my earlier writings in
this matter, it will come as no surprise that I find this
argumentation confusing. Also, as I will explain further, I do not
agree with the conclusion that the Arctic Council in its present
form should be viewed as creating a "gap." However, even if I do
not agree with some of the conclusions, the Overview and Gap
Analysis is nevertheless an excellent paper on a very complex
subject. I believe that WWF and the authors of the analysis
should be commended for this valuable contribution to a very
important discussion, and I definitely recommend that all
concerned study the analysis.
As I have maintained in the past, there is already a binding
legal regime that applies in the Arctic, namely UNCLOS. Rather
than focusing on new regimes, we should concentrate our
resources on working with what we have and examining whether
the present legal regime is sufficient. I believe that the conclusion
today is that it is not; therefore, we must work towards

governed by the rules set forth in the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea and noting that established international law has been very useful in past
delimitation negotiations). But cf. Corell, supra note 1, (arguing that the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is the governing legal regime in the
Arctic).
14.
See Arctic Council, Arctic Frontiers-The Age of the Arctic, http://arcticcouncil.org/meeting/arcticfrontiers_-_the-ageof the-arctic (last visited Sept. 26,
2009).
15.
See TIMO KOIVUROVA & ERIK J. MOLENAAR, INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OF THE MARINE ARCTIC: OVERVIEW AND GAP
ANALYSIS (2009), available at http://www.wwf.se/source.php/1223579/lnternational
%20Governance%20and%2ORegulation%2of/o2Othe%20Marine%20Arctic.pdf.
This report was prepared for the WWF International Arctic Programme by Timo
Koivurova and Erik J.Molenaar and was published by WWF in January 2009.
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strengthening it. As a first step, we should ensure that the
existing regime is implemented and that states that have not yet
acceded to or otherwise accepted elements of this regime do so.
We should also work to build political support to achieve the
necessary protection of the Arctic. Having studied the analysis
commissioned by WWF and presented at the Tromso Conference,
I am even more convinced that this is the right way to proceed.
It is a fact that the U.S. has not yet ratified UNCLOS. 16 The
analysis also identifies other relevant treaties that have not yet
been ratified by one or more of the Arctic states. Whether these
omissions should be described as "gaps" is a question of
semantics. The rules are there and may even be in force. It then
becomes a question of convincing the states that have not yet
ratified or acceded to the treaties to do so.
An important point that I have made in the past, and which
clearly emerges from the analysis referred to, is that the
constituencies are completely different depending on the subject
matter regulated or to be regulated. UNCLOS is a case in point.
The rules that govern the territorial sea, the exclusive economic
zone, and the continental shelf are laid down in that
Convention. 17 Those rules mainly concern the Arctic coastal
states. However, if the Arctic Ocean, because of climate change,
becomes navigable part of the year, then the high seas regime in
UNCLOS comes into play.' 8 In such matters, all states have a
legitimate interest.
These two features of UNCLOS could serve as an illustration
of the complexity of the legal regime that applies in the Arctic. In
between, we find a variety of subjects that are regulated by other
conventions. Some of these treaties are global, while some of
them are regional or bilateral. One example is the collective
Maritime
the
International
by
elaborated
instruments
Organisation (IMO) that apply worldwide. With respect to the
Arctic, reference should be made to the guidelines for ships
operating in Arctic ice-covered waters approved by the Maritime
Safety Committee and the Marine Environment Protection
Committee in 2002 to apply in addition to the mandatory and
IMO
in existing
contained
provisions
recommendatory
instruments. 19 Furthermore, the IMO is presently engaged in

16.
See United Nations Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties Deposited
with the Secretary-General, Status of Treaties, United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea n.2, available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=21&
subid=A&ang-en (last visited Sept. 26, 2009) (follow link for "United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea") (stating that UNCLOS was signed by the
United States on December 10, 1982 but containing no record that UNCLOS was
ever ratified by the United States).
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 11
17.
(establishing the legal framework and rules that now govern the sea).
See id. art. 86 (introducing Part VII of UNCLOS as governing the high
18.
seas).
Int'l Maritime Org. [IMO], Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice19.
Covered Waters, IMO Doc. MSC/Circ.1056 - MEPC/Circ.399 (Dec. 23, 2008).
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elaborating a regulatory regime on the reduction of greenhouse
gases from shipping. Obviously, such a regime would have to
20
apply worldwide.
In addition, some of the treaties that apply worldwide or with
respect to regions are administered by designated organizations.
There are also cases where such organizations actually supervise
treaty compliance. Against this background, it would be counterproductive to start elaborating "a new legal regime" for the Arctic.
I will revert to this matter in addressing the administration of the
Arctic.
As a matter of fact, an analysis of the legal regime in the
Arctic points to a problem that exists on a global scale; a
broadened analysis of the kind commissioned by WWF would
indicate that the same "gaps" appear in other regions as well.
This is also partly demonstrated in the analysis. In a sense, this
is quite natural. The need for new rules will always be there as a
consequence of new phenomena, new discoveries, and new
techniques. One hundred years ago, who would have dreamt of a
Moon Treaty?2 1 Treaties will have to be concluded as the need
arises. Consequently, what is needed is research, scientific data,
information provided to the general
public and their
representatives, and, not least, political will to address, in a
systematic manner, the questions that must be dealt with.
Surely, there are many such questions relating to the Arctic.

IV. ENVIRONMENTAL AND SECURITY CONCERNS

The focus of the third part of my presentation is the
environment and security. In this context, I will address fisheries
and extraction of hydrocarbons as part of the environment. These
questions were extensively attended to at a conference organized
by the Nordic Council of Ministers and held September 9-10,
2008, at Ilulissat in Greenland, entitled "Common Concern for the
Arctic." I had the privilege of chairing this conference and was
also asked to present conclusions. From the Conference Report, it

available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data-id%3D6629/
1056-MEPC-Circ399.pdf.
20.
See IMO, Marine Env't Prot. Comm. (MEPC), 58th Sess. (Oct. 6-10,
2008), http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topic-id=109&doc id=9932 (last
visited Sept. 27, 2009) (noting that any regulatory regime aimed at reducing
greenhouse gas emissions from ships would not be effective for the purpose of
combating climate change unless it applied to all countries, not just those listed in
Annex I of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change).
21.
See Agreement governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3
(outlining agreement among the state parties for the exploration and use of the
moon).
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are referred to as "gaps" in the
appears that many questions that
22
WWF analysis were discussed.
In particular, it was concluded that mechanisms must be
developed which can provide for regulated access to new fisheries,
whether in new areas that become accessible or in areas where
23
It was also
new fish stocks appear due to climate change.
concluded that methods and tools need to be developed to
effectively enforce such management regimes. 24 Since there is a
risk that non-regulated fisheries will develop in the Arctic, it was
noted specifically that instruments are urgently needed to
effectively prevent illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing,
so-called IUU fishing. 25 Another conclusion was that the EU
must be
management
marine
to
approach
ecosystem
strengthened, extended, and made operational through a legal
basis for international cooperation in the Arctic Ocean as a
26
whole.
It was also stressed that activities related to oil and gas in
the Arctic Ocean must be prudent. 27 This would require high
environmental standards adapted to the sensitivity of the Arctic.
The following elements were mentioned: ecosystem based
management; rigorous environmental and strategic impact
assessment; effective prevention, preparedness, and response to
accidents, including clean-up of pollution incidents; and advanced
With respect to production and
monitoring and research. 28
transport of oil and gas in and through ice-affected waters, it was
29
The safety
concluded that it should be carefully regulated.
issues, including environmental protection, must be further
analyzed.
It was also noted that tourism shipping appears to be the
biggest short- to medium-term challenge within the maritime
transport sector in the Arctic and should be addressed with
30
urgency.
A particular issue that was discussed at Ilulissat was
maritime safety in Arctic waters.31 It was felt that governments
should bring their concerns to the attention of the IMO so that
Member States could consider them with a view towards finding
It was specifically
internationally agreed-upon solutions. 32

Common Concern for the Arctic Conference, Ilulissat, Green., Sept. 922.
10, 2008, Conference Report, available at http://www.norden.org/da/publikationer/
publikationer/2008-750/at downloadlpublicationfile.
23.
Id. at 25, 88-90.
Id. at 25, 97.
24.
Id. at 25, 89.
25.
26.
Id. at 25, 88-89, 93.
27.
Id. at 27.
28.
Id. at 27, 104.
Id. at 27, 100, 108, 110. But see id. at 107 ("Production and transport of
29.
oil in and through ice-affected waters has to be halted, as no technology currently
exists to clean up spills under these conditions.").
Id. at 27.
30.
Id. at 110, 115-16.
31.
Id. at 27, 118.
32.
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33
pointed out that unilateral regional action should be avoided.
The Conference Report provides a detailed examination of these
34
conclusions.
The conclusions from the Ilulissat Conference in September
2008, and the Conference at Tromso in January 2009, point in the
same direction. Whether you define certain elements as "gaps" or
not, it is necessary to address them. In most cases, the need is
urgent.
This brings me to the last and main part of my
presentation: the administration of the Arctic.

V. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ARCTIC
On this subject, I would like to take as a point of departure
the fact that the WWF-commissioned analysis identifies as a
"gap" that the Ottawa Declaration on the Establishment of the
Arctic Council does not impose legally binding obligations on any
of its participants and that the Arctic Council is also not
empowered to impose such obligations. 35 However, in my view,
because of the way in which the Arctic Council is designed and
meant to operate, the Council is simply not suited for such tasks.
Nor should the Council be redesigned and entrusted with such
tasks. Rather, the Council should be maintained and further
developed as an indispensable tool for coordination of policy
decisions.
This means that I tend to agree with the views expressed by
Professor Oran Young at the Conference at Tromso. He suggests
that the Arctic Council, particularly when it convenes at the
ministerial level, may have a role to play in addressing problems
arising from the interplay between various issue-specific
regulatory arrangements. 36
Using as examples commercial
shipping in the Arctic and a fisheries regime relating to stocks
that are not confined to the exclusive economic zones of individual
states, and suggesting that the IMO and the FAO may not be able
or willing to take steps on their own to iron out these differences,
Young puts forward:
What is required in such cases is a higher level policy forum that

can address the relevant issues in comprehensive terms and
without any crippling bias that undermines its ability to resolve
such problems in a constructive fashion. The relevant skills in
such cases are those of a facilitator rather than a regulator, and
this is a role that the Arctic Council may well be able to perform,
despite its lack of decision making authority and material
37
resources.

33.

Id. at 27, 112-13.

34.

Id.

35.
KoIVUROVA & MOLENAAR, supra note 15, at 5, 35.
36.
Oran R. Young, Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the
CircumpolarNorth, 45 POLAR REC. 73, 81 (2009).
37.
Id.
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Consequently, and with specific reference to my analysis in the
foregoing, it is imperative that the mandates entrusted to the
various bodies established by the conventions that apply in the
Arctic are not compromised by competing institutions. At the
same time, the Arctic Council, with its relatively informal rules
and opportunities for participation, offers a venue where different
actors can participate and discuss a broad range of issues that, in
many cases, cut across administrative borders. 38 In this way, the
work of existing and maybe additional institutions can actually be
enhanced.
I have, in another context, pointed to a dilemma that
increasingly will emerge when states engage in treaty making,
namely the difficulty of establishing a coherent system of rules at
the international level. 39 The dilemma can be illustrated as
follows. Every organ entrusted with a mandate to negotiate
international agreements, in particular international conferences,
has a tendency to believe that it is sovereign and might be
reluctant to look at instruments adopted in other forums. An
additional problem is that instructions to national delegations in
such negotiations often emanate from different ministries at the
national level. The lack of coordination often starts here.
My conclusion is that an increasing number of international
agreements will pose the risk of contradictory obligations. This
will, in turn, lead to difficulties when the obligations are to be
implemented and applied. If the system becomes too inconsistent,
there will be negative effects on the respect for the norms agreed
upon. I believe that the Arctic Council provides an excellent
forum for coordination so that such consequences can be avoided
in the Arctic as far as possible.
Against this background, the Ilulissat Declaration is of
particular interest:
The Arctic Council and other international fora, including the
Barents Euro-Arctic Council, have already taken important steps
on specific issues, for example with regard to safety of navigation,
search and rescue, environmental monitoring and disaster
response and scientific cooperation, which are relevant also to the
Arctic Ocean. The five coastal states of the Arctic Ocean will
continue to contribute actively to the work of the Arctic Council
40
and other relevant international fora.

At the Ilulissat Conference in September 2008, it was
believed that possible options for enhancing environmental

See, e.g., ARCTIC COUNCIL R.P. 36, available at http://arctic38.
(enabling the
council.org/filearchive/official%20rules%20and%20procedures.pdf
Arctic Council to grant "observer status" to non-member states, intergovernmental
organizations and nongovernmental organizations); ARCTIC COUNCIL R.P. 38, available
http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/official%20rules%20and%20procedures.pdf
at
(allowing observers to make statements at the discretion of the chair and submit
relevant documents to Council meetings).
Hans Corell, Keynote Address at the Hertie School of Government
39.
Conference: International Law in Flux 5 (Sept. 8, 2006), available at
http://www.havc.se/res/SelectedMaterialU20060908corellintllawinfluxfinal.pdf.
40.
Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 2, at 155.
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governance of the Arctic should be considered. Such options
might include an UNCLOS implementing agreement for
environmental issues; a regional sea agreement (along the lines of
the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of
the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR)); further development of
multilateral environmental agreements at the global or regional
level; strengthening and broadening the role of the Arctic Council;
ensuring participation by a broader range of stakeholders; more
engagement by the EU and use of the tools it has to offer
(research, European Environment Agency, funding via, e.g.,
Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership, participation in
41
the Arctic Council, etc.); or a combination of these solutions.
With respect to the European Union, it is interesting to note
that matters relating to the Arctic have been brought more into
focus lately.
On October 9, 2008, the European Parliament
adopted a resolution in which it expressed its concerns over the
effects of climate change on the sustainability of the lives of the
indigenous peoples in the region. 42 This was in terms of "both
the ... environment (melting icecap and permafrost, rising sea
levels and flooding) and the natural habitat (the retreating icecap
poses problems for polar bears' feeding habits). ' ' 43 The Parliament
"underlin[ed] that any international decisions on these issues
must fully involve and take account of all peoples and nations of
the Arctic. ' 44 The Parliament also stated that it "await[ed], with
great interest, the forthcoming Commission communication on
Arctic policy, and it
[expressed the] hope[
that the
communication would lay the foundations for a meaningful EU
Arctic policy." 45 In particular, the Parliament called on the
Commission to address, at least, the following issues in its
communication:
a) the state of play in relation to climate change, and adaptation to
it, in the region;
b) policy options that respect the indigenous populations and their

livelihoods;
c) the need to cooperate with its Arctic neighbours on cross-border
issues, in particular maritime safety; and

d) options for a future cross-border political or legal structure that
could provide for the environmental protection and sustainable
orderly development of the region or mediate political disagreement
46
over resources and navigable waterways in the High North;

41.

Common Concern for the Arctic Conference, supra note 22, at 27, 104-

42.

European Parliament Resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic

06.
Governance, EUR. PARL. DOC. P6_TA(2008)0474 para. M (2008).

43.
44.
45.

Id. at para. N.I.
Id.
Id. at para. N.7.

46.

Id. at paras. N.7(a)-(d).
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The Parliament expressed "particular[] concern[] over the ongoing
race for natural resources in the Arctic, which may lead to
security threats for the EU and overall international
instability. ' 47 In this context, it is also important to note that the
Parliament "urge[d] the Commission to take a proactive role in
the Arctic by at least, as a first step, taking up 'observer status' on
' 48
the Arctic Council.
On November 20, 2008, the European Commission adopted a
communication from the Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council entitled "The European Union and the Arctic
Region. ' 49 The communication points to "the role of climate
change as a 'threats multiplier"' and maintains that "the
Commission and the High Representative for the Common
Foreign and Security Policy have pointed out that environmental
changes are altering the geo-strategic dynamics of the Arctic with
potential consequences for international stability and European
security interests calling for the development of an EU Arctic

policy."50 It continues:

On the whole, Arctic challenges and opportunities will have
significant repercussions on the life of European citizens for
generations to come. It is imperative for the European Union to
address them in a coordinated and systematic manner, in
cooperation with Arctic states, territories and other stakeholders.
This Communication sets out EU interests and proposes action for
EU Member States and institutions around three main policy
objectives:
- Protecting
population

and

preserving

the

Arctic

in unison

with

its

- Promoting sustainable use of resources
- Contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance

51

In this context, the U.S. Arctic Policy document deserves
particular attention. The directive, which is to be implemented in
a manner consistent with (1) the Constitution and laws of the
United States; (2) the obligations of the United States under the
treaties and other international agreements to which the United
States is a party; and (3) customary international law as
recognized by the United States, including with respect to the law
of the sea, states that it is the policy of the United States to:
1.

Meet national security and homeland security needs relevant
to the Arctic region;

2.

Protect the Arctic environment and conserve its biological

resources;
3.

Ensure that natural resource management and economic
development in the region are environmentally sustainable;

47.
Id. at para. N.13.
Id. at para. N.14.
48.
The European Union and the Arctic Region, COM (2008) 763 final
49.
(Nov. 20, 2008).
50.
Id. at 2.
51.
Id. at 2-3.
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4.

Strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic
nations (the United States, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, and Sweden);

5.

Involve the Arctic's indigenous communities in decisions that
affect them; and

6.

Enhance

scientific monitoring and research
52
regional, and global environmental issues.

into
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This directive can actually be read as another inventory of issues
relating to the Arctic that need to be addressed.
Of particular interest with respect to the administration of
the Arctic is the statement that "[a]s the Arctic changes and
human activity in the region increases, the U.S. and other
governments should consider, as appropriate, new international
arrangements or enhancements to existing arrangements. ' 53 It is
also said that the competent authorities should "[s]eek to develop
ways to address changing and expanding commercial fisheries in
the Arctic, including through consideration of international
54
agreements or organizations to govern future Arctic fisheries."
The position of the U.S. with respect to the Arctic Council is
that it "should remain a high-level forum devoted to issues within
its current mandate." 55 It should not, however, be "transformed
into a formal international organization, particularly one with
assessed contributions.156 The U.S. "is nevertheless open to
updating the structure of the Council, including consolidation of,
or operational changes to, its subsidiary bodies to the extent that
such changes can clearly improve the Council's work and
'5 7
are consistent with the general mandate of the Council.
As regards the Russian Federation, there are many aspects
that could be mentioned. One is the tendency to view the Arctic
as a matter essentially for the coastal states. However, let me, in
this context, focus on the question of an ecosystem-based ocean
management with respect to the Russian Arctic. Professor V.
Denisov addressed this question at Tromso with reference to a
presentation that he had prepared with two colleagues. 58 Their
conclusions were "that integrated ecosystem-based approaches to
ocean management in Russia remain poorly recognized and
accepted among both the majority of administrative circles of all
levels (federal, regional, and local) and other stakeholders
(businesses, local populations, voluntary organizations) [to whom]
participation in the decision-making process is of critical

52.
Directive on Arctic Region Policy, supra note 4, at 48.
53.
See id. at 49.
54.
Id. at 54.
55.
Id. at 49.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Vladimir Denisov, et al., Ecosystem-Based Ocean Management
Practices in the Russian Arctic (Jan. 21, 2009), in 2009 ABSTRACTS: ARCTIC
MARINE ECOSYSTEMS IN AN ERA OF RAPID CLIMATE CHANGE 9 (University of
Tromso et al. eds., 2009) (Nor.), available at http://www.arctic-frontiers.com/
index.php?option=com-docman&task=catview&gid=60&Itemid=155.
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importance. ' 59 They further concluded that "Russia's coastal and
sea activities still continue to be managed on the basis of a
sectoral
or departmental
approach. ' 60
In their view,
"[d]evelopment and application of integrated ecosystem-based
approaches to coastal and sea management in Russia largely
depends on personal motivation and social responsibility of key
managers at regional and local levels"; in other words, "subjective
factors still play a substantial role. ' 61 Another negative factor
identified by Professor Denisov and his colleagues is "gaps in the
current legislation regulating coastal and sea activities in
62
Russia."
These issues are also on the agenda in the other Arctic states.
But the conclusion must be that there remains a lot to be done to
enhance the administration of the Arctic. Maybe a strengthened
Arctic Council is the appropriate venue for the overarching policy
discussions that obviously are necessary.

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Let me conclude by suggesting that the Arctic actually offers
an opportunity for states concerned-in particular the Arctic
coastal states-to demonstrate that they are able to cooperate
actively in a constructive manner. As a matter of fact, the Arctic
could be seen as an opportunity for the Arctic states to set an
example by demonstrating how responsible actors on the
international arena should interact. Basically, this was the idea
when the Arctic Council was established.
But the Arctic must also be seen in a global context,
including from the viewpoint of international peace and security.
What is most worrying is that some major players on the
international arena did not see the opportunity when the Berlin
Wall came down in 1989. In summing up at the Arctic Frontiers
meeting at Tromso, I expressed regret that, in particular, the
West did not remember the lesson from the end of World War II.
At that time, positive development was generated by the way in
which the former enemy states were treated, paving the way for
what is now the European Union. From that lesson it was evident
that greater efforts should have been made to develop a true and
trustful partnership with the Russian Federation when the Soviet
Union broke up. Instead, major players, in particular the U.S.,
started going it alone. The damage that the misnomer "War on
Terrorism" has done to the U.S. and the world at large will take a
long time to repair. The illegal attack on Iraq in March 2003 is
another deplorable demonstration of disrespect for international
law, especially the Charter of the United Nations. So is the

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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attack on Georgia in the summer of 2008. This has raised tensions
in international relations in general and between the two major
powers among the Arctic states in particular, the Russian
Federation and the United States.
Let us hope that the new U.S. administration can make a
move to reverse this development. And the Russian Federation
must respond, including by greater efforts to establish democracy
and the rule of law at the national level, as so convincingly argued
by the President of the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation. 63 Good relations between Moscow and Washington
are imperative for a more positive development in the field of
international peace and security. The unfortunate tensions that
have developed between the two major powers bordering the
Arctic simply must be removed, and this can be achieved only
through a demonstration of statesmanship on both sides. This
should also be seen as an opportunity.
This is where I believe that the Arctic could serve as a
catalyst and a steppingstone. The interaction with the other six
Arctic states, all democracies and states under the rule of law,
should provide a setting for close cooperation in matters that, in
effect, concern the entire state community.
In order to bring about the necessary action and achieve
results, it is necessary that matters relating to the Arctic are
addressed at the highest political level. For this reason, the
Arctic states may wish to review how their national agencies
responsible for the Arctic are organized and whether the
interaction between those agencies and political leaders could be
enhanced. One way of ascertaining that added political impetus
is injected into the process-and this would be my respectful
suggestion-would be to organize the 2011 Arctic Council meeting
at the level of heads of state and government.
Finally, it should be pointed out that there is a clear
connection between the work to protect the Arctic and the work
necessary to develop an effective post-2012 climate regime,
expected to be agreed upon at the Climate Change Conference in
Copenhagen in December 2009.
It is in this broad political context that the Arctic should be
seen as an opportunity rather than a problem.

63.
Valery Zorkin, President, Russian Fed'n Constitutional Court, Rule of
Law and Legal Awareness (July 6, 2007), in THE WORLD RULE OF LAW MOVEMENT
AND RUSSIAN LEGAL REFORM 46, 55-61 (Francis Neate & Holly Nielsen eds.,
2007).

